How do global critical mineral deals really shape supply chains and markets?

Geopolitical competition

China enjoys a commanding position in global minerals and metals supply chains, including many materials deemed critical for defence and the energy transition. Over decades of industrial policy and coordinated public–private investment in extractive industries and infrastructure projects across resource-rich countries, it has secured control over the production and refining of minerals such as gallium, tungsten, graphite, silicon, and rare earth elements. As a result, China now maintains a leading presence across numerous mineral and metal supply chains – not only at the extraction stage, but also in the midstream segments where processing, refining, and smelting occur.

In the current geopolitical climate, China’s dominance in mineral and metal supply chains – bordering on virtual monopoly in some cases – is increasingly seen by other states in terms of geopolitical risk. China’s leverage over critical minerals was on full display in October 2025 when Trump agreed to trim tariffs on Chinese goods in exchange for Beijing holding off on stricter restrictions on rare earths exports. Earlier last year, export controls on gallium, germanium, antimony, and rare earths disrupted supply chains, exposing the automotive and defence sectors.

To counter China’s dominant position and protect domestic production capacity, other governments around the world are increasingly focused on bilateral agreements and multilateral frameworks to establish critical mineral partnerships and “friendshoring” to guarantee resilient supply chains to their countries. While these policy efforts demonstrate growing awareness of the strategic importance of mineral supply chains, they do not directly translate into extraction, as closer examination of recent deals reveals; as such, the actual impacts of these deals in terms of both national security for the signatories and for the minerals and metal market remains to be seen. There are also important differences between these policies.

From diplomatic deals to supply chain realities

In perhaps the most prominent example, the U.S. is intensifying its strategic efforts to secure supply chains amid escalating geopolitical tensions. During recent talks on Ukraine’s mineral wealth, and in the context of the Washington-brokered Democratic Republic of Congo-Rwanda peace accord, promoting access to investment in these strategic resources was front and centre. A quick review of these deals speaks to the gap between policy intent and market impacts for mineral and metal supply chains.

The Trump Administration has repeatedly gestured to Ukraine’s significant mineral wealth in the context of a US-brokered end to Russia’s war in the country. That Ukraine possesses untapped mineral wealth is widely acknowledged. However, most (if not all) geological surveys date back to Soviet times, with no recent assessments available. As such the true value of these minerals remains uncertain. Moreover, given that mines typically take around 17 years to become operational, any return on investment in Ukraine’s mineral resources will not materialise in the short term. The ongoing war has destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure, meaning that before any mine can operate, Ukraine must first rebuild its energy capacity to support such operations. Finally, the region remains politically and militarily unstable. Confidence in a jurisdiction’s stability is critical for attracting investment, and in Ukraine’s case, it is impossible to say when such stability will be achieved.

Similarly, the US-brokered peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda inserts mineral sourcing ambitions into a complex conflict context.  The deal aims to end decades of conflict in eastern DRC where M23 rebels, backed by Rwandan forces, seized major cities and mineral-rich areas. Culminating in the 4 December 2025, Washington Accords, the agreement mandates troop withdrawal, demobilisation of militias, and the establishment of a Washington-backed Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF) for minerals trade. The US-DRC Strategic Partnership, signed concurrently, prioritises secure exports of copper, cobalt, zinc, and other critical minerals. This Partnership was hailed by President Trump hailed as facilitating billions in Western investments in a region holding significant reserves of critical minerals.

However, as of February 2026, implementation of the Washington Accords remains stalled, with Rwandan forces not fully withdrawn and M23 rebels continuing to advance in eastern DRC. Critics argue the deal prioritises U.S. mineral access over genuine peace, further deepening insecurity; concerns that are sure to grow as the list of Congolese assets under consideration in the deal expands to conflict-affected areas like coltan-rich Rubaya in North Kivu in recent reporting.

Closing the critical minerals gap – from policy to practice

While these geopolitical deals make waves, Washington is using additional tools to turn the tables in the minerals and metals sector. As the Chinese example in fact shows, coordinated investment policy and market interventions are increasingly recognised as necessary to move the needle in the minerals and metals sector from policy intentions to concrete supply chain changes.

On February 2, the United States announced the establishment of Project Vault, a $12 billion strategic reserve that encompasses minerals present on the U.S. Geological Survey’s critical minerals list. The initiative seeks to shield American manufacturers from supply chain disruptions. This public-private fund requires manufacturers to make long-term commitments and pay fees in return for guaranteed access to specified materials during crises, aiming to prevent scenarios like Ford’s 2025 production halt. However, Project Vault currently imposes no geographic restrictions on sourcing, meaning it is vulnerable to competitors like China for supply.

On 4 February, the US then established its Critical Minerals Ministerial, which pledges to use a number of direct market intervention tools to create an enabling environment for American and allied investment in supply chains. It does this by absorbing risk, such as by establishing reference prices at various production stage as enforceable price floors, maintained via adjustable tariffs on non-member imports to protect allied producers from market flooding and volatility. The goal is to stabilise prices, encourage investment in non-Chinese supply chains, and escape what the State Department referred to as sourcing minerals “heavily concentrated in the hands of one country.” This use of trade tools to enable investment shifts reflects a strategic change amid concerns over China’s market influence. Most recently, the FORGE alliance (to replace the Minerals Security Partnerships unveiled since 2022) promises to bring this new strategy to bear with agile, innovative policy interventions to enable investment.

The European example – ambition v reality

While the results of the more recent US deals remain to be seen, the outcomes to date of the European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) – adopted in December 2023 and in force since May 2024 – are instructive for understanding the gaps between policy making and commercial development of critical minerals deals.

The CRMA establishes supply chain diversification targets designed to reduce foreign dependency. For minerals in scope, it sets goals of 10% domestic Union extraction, 40% domestic processing, 25% recycling, and limits reliance on any single country to no more than 65%. Yet many critical materials, including lithium, magnesium, gallium, and rare earth elements, continue to surpass this limit at the processing stage today. Further, a recent critical evaluation of the CRMA’s impact by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) shows systemic flaws, including non-binding targets, ineffective partnerships, and structural barriers.

The Chvaletice manganese project in the Czech Republic is one example of the CRMA’s shortcomings. Despite receiving Strategic Project designation from the European Commission under the CRMA, the project has faced prolonged delays in permitting and grid access. Because Czech national law has not yet incorporated the CRMA’s fast-track permitting provisions, an implementation gap has emerged. Similarly, the EU supports LKAB’s rare earths extraction and processing facilities in Sweden. Despite receiving the Strategic Project status under the CRMA, development remains stuck in preliminary exploration stages. Rigorous EU and Swedish environmental regulations and social protections effectively nullify the CRMA’s acceleration mechanisms.

As these examples show, setting policy priorities in the minerals and metals sector is only the first step; tangible impacts on supply chains can often remain elusive without careful planning and robust execution.

With new mineral deals continuing to unfold in every direction, TDi helps governments, organisations and businesses to navigate complex regulatory landscapes and align policy goals with actionable solutions. Get in touch to discuss how our experts can support you in the development of sustainable and scalable supply chain strategies and build long-term resilience amidst external geopolitical pressure.