International Energy Agency’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 

If the International Energy Agency’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 is clear on one issue, it is that 2025 was the year supply chain concentration risk moved from theory to reality. TDi has long tracked and analysed the degree of supply chain concentration across mined commodities, but the IEA’s report is nonetheless a stark picture of how these dynamics are playing out in real time today.

• Export controls: China has tripled its implementation of export controls since 2023, using its dominant position in mineral and metal supply chains for geostrategic leverage. As of 2026, these controls have impacted antimony, bismuth, gallium, germanium, refined graphite, indium, molybdenum, rare earths, sulphuric acid, tellurium, tungsten, as well as lithium iron phosphate batteries and lithium refining.
• Producer-nation controls: China is joined by producing countries that have introduced restrictions and export bans in attempts to strengthen their position in global supply chains where the degree of overall concentration gives them potential leverage. The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s cobalt export quotas, dating from October 2025, saw prices increase threefold by Q1 of 2026. Zimbabwe implemented lithium trade restrictions in February 2026 and is considering a potential export ban in 2027. Mozambique has put in place graphite trade restrictions; the Philippines proposed a ban on raw mineral exports to start in 2030 while Gabon introduced a ban on raw manganese exports starting in 2029, andGuinea introduced a new export control on bauxite from June 2026 onwards.

Each of these measures underscore the volatility and uncertainty currently facing mineral and metals markets, and the extent to which the industry is increasingly in the crosshairs of global geopolitics.

Perhaps nowhere was this more evident than in the outbreak of the US-Israel war on Iran in February 2026. The sprawling Middle East conflict created foreseeable shockwaves across supply chains like oil and gas. However, as the IEA makes clear, there have been significant and less-anticipated spillover impacts for important mineral and metal markets, including base metals like aluminium, auxiliaries like sulphur, and helium, an important industrial gas. When combined with policies like Chinese export controls, how supply chain concentration can cause global market disruptions and volatility far downstream becomes all the more apparent.

Aluminium has been particularly harshly impacted given the conflict’s impacts on key smelters in the region which have been forced to declare force majeure shutdowns thanks to the conflict. The Gulf region provides about 8% of global aluminium supply chains, and the logistics and shipping blockages as the conflict plays out in the Strait of Hormuz mean that East Asian markets are all the more important. Only upcoming new Indonesian smelting capacity is expected to offer potential relief to already tight supply chains.

A third interesting dimension of the IEA report is its focus on efforts to diversify supply chains, including through policy-driven measures that again highlight the centrality of the minerals and metals market to current geopolitical competition. Investment in new mining and beneficiation projects, outside dominant suppliers, is one key way of advancing diversification. The report points to a number of significant hurdles to build ex-China supply chains for many critical minerals, including much higher capital costs for establishing projects outside of China. These include infrastructure, construction, and land acquisition, in addition to the costs of operating ready facilities. At the refining stage, these costs are on average 50% higher across cobalt sulphate, nickel sulphate, natural graphite, synthetic graphite, and lithium hydroxide.

The IEA recognises that these factors are currently limiting investment in critical mineral material supply chain diversification, despite the political attention the objective receives today. This structural reality is evident in recent findings on the impact of western critical mineral policies – including those demanding rapid diversification away from China, as investment capital is slow to follow policy objectives.

Recycling provides another route to diversification. The IEA’s 2026 Outlook projects, under current policy settings, average recycling rates across key energy minerals could rise from around 10% today to close to 20% by 2040. Copper and cobalt already have relatively established recycling streams, while lithium, nickel, and rare earth magnet recycling are expected to grow as more material reaches end of life. But secondary supply has its own concentration risk. China accounts for more than three-quarters of global battery pre-treatment capacity and 90% of material recovery capacity, with Korea the leading material-recovery player outside China. Recycling can therefore reduce pressure on primary supply and widen sourcing options, but its contribution to resilience will depend on investment in collection, recycling infrastructure, processing capacity, and sustained demand for recycled materials across a broader set of markets.

Looking Forward

The IEA’s 2026 Outlook makes a wider point about what diversification now requires. Supply security cannot be reduced to bringing more mines online. Concentration sits across mining, refining, processing technology, infrastructure, and increasingly recycling, while export controls and geopolitical shocks can turn those chokepoints into market disruption very quickly. More resilient mineral supply chains will require a combination of new primary supply, viable midstream capacity, secondary supply, and policy mechanisms that make diversified projects commercially investable.

For companies, supply-chain concentration now needs to be understood alongside price, operational, and sustainability risk. Knowing where exposure sits, testing the resilience of suppliers and logistics routes, and developing credible alternatives before disruption occurs will increasingly shape both supply security and commercial continuity.

TDi Sustainability supports companies across mineral and metal value chains to understand and manage supply-chain risk, including through supply-chain mapping, risk assessment, due diligence, and data-driven risk management. These capabilities can help businesses identify where concentration and vulnerability sit, prioritise action, and build more resilient sourcing strategies.

Get in touch with TDi Sustainability to discuss how we can support your business in understanding and managing critical minerals supply-chain risk.